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MAYHEW v. TOWN OF SMYRNA: THE 
SIXTH CIRCUIT FRUSTRATES PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
Abstract: On May 11, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 
in Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, held that the protected status of a public em-
ployee’s speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim remains one of law, ra-
ther than one of mixed law and fact. In so doing, the Sixth Circuit disallowed 
jury determinations on the fact-intensive inquiry into the protected status of 
the employee’s speech. This Comment argues that despite having the invalua-
ble opportunity—as a historically conservative court—to defend the voices of 
public employees, the Sixth Circuit continued its obliteration of public em-
ployees’ right to a jury trial. This Comment further argues that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision could leave much of public sector misconduct unreported. 
INTRODUCTION 
Before the U.S. Supreme Court decided Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion in 1968, government employees were afforded minimal First Amend-
ment protection of their critical expressions at work.1 In Pickering, the 
Court held that public employees do not lose First Amendment protection 
while working for the government, but still limited their ability to speak out 
in significant ways.2  
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals are split over whether the inquiry in-
to the protected status of speech under the First Amendment is purely a 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 565–66, 574 (1968) (holding that a board of 
education’s firing of a teacher for his letter to a newspaper criticizing the board for alleged mis-
management of school funds violated his First Amendment right to free speech). A public em-
ployee is typically someone who works within a place of business in charge of the local or nation-
al government’s affairs. Civil Servant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). As noted by 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, then a Justice on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, these work-
ers had “a constitutional right to talk politics,” but “no constitutional right to be a policeman.” 
McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). The U.S. Supreme Court 
noted ninety years later, “[f]or many years, Holmes’ epigram expressed this Court’s law” that 
public employees must accept their work as a mere privilege, which the government could regu-
late without fear of Constitutional review. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143–44 (1983). 
 2 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 56 (protecting public employees’ first amendment rights only in 
situations where the employee speaks on issue of public concern and when the employee’s interest 
in speaking outweighs the employer’s interest in efficiency). The legal theory underlying the Su-
preme Court’s change in its interpretation of public employees’ First Amendment protections is 
that a State cannot condition public employment on a basis that encroaches on the employee’s 
interest in exercising their constitutionally protected free speech. Connick, 461 U.S. at 142; see 
also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994) (stating that the government was not justified 
in restricting employees’ speech that did not detract from running effective workplace). 
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question of law.3 When a judge decides certain speech is unprotected as a 
matter of law, despite the existence of a material factual dispute as to the 
speaker’s status as a public employee when speaking, the case is removed 
from the jury in lieu of a bench trial.4 The court decides the issue, rather 
than the public employee’s peers who may be better suited for the task.5 It 
was against this backdrop that in 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit revisited the issue in Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna.6 
Before the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lane v. Franks—the 
most recent public employee First Amendment retaliation claim decided by 
the Court—the Sixth Circuit had treated the inquiry into the protected status 
of speech as one of law.7 In 2017, in Mayhew, the Sixth Circuit had the 
chance to reconsider this longstanding employer-friendly tradition.8 
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s 
public employee free speech framework, and more specifically, the protect-
ed speech element.9 Part I goes on to detail the current circuit split regard-
ing whether this inquiry is a question of law for the court to decide, or a 
mixed question of law and fact that may need to be resolved by a jury.10 
Part II details the procedural history and provides a factual overview of 
Mayhew.11 Part II then examines and discusses the Sixth Circuit’s holding 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2010) (discuss-
ing the circuit split regarding whether the inquiry into the protected status of speech remains question 
of law or has transformed into mixed question of law and fact); Reilly v. City of Atlantic City, 532 
F.3d 216, 227 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a police officer’s truthful testimony constituted protect-
ed speech as matter of mixed fact and law); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 
F.3d 1192, 1198–99, 1202, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a teacher’s grievances for speech 
restrictions, charter renewal, and school elections were protected speech as matter of law). 
 4 See Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (ex-
plaining that mixed questions of law and fact are issues typically presented to a jury, not a judge); 
Questions of Law, id.; infra notes 28–31 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction be-
tween questions of law and questions of mixed law and fact). 
 5 See infra notes 37–57 and accompanying text (discussing fact-intensive nature of the inquiry 
into whether the plaintiff spoke as a citizen or as a public employee) 
6 Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 2017) 
 7 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2014); Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462; Rorrer v. City of 
Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1047–48 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding a firefighter’s testimony at arbitration 
about colleague’s discipline by department was about private matter and unprotected as matter of 
law); Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 274, 277 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the school admin-
istrator’s op-ed column in local press that criticized comparisons between the civil-rights and gay-
rights movements was on a political or policy issue and therefore unprotected as a matter of law); 
Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding a firefighter’s critical 
comments of the city council constituted protected speech as matter of law); infra notes 39–45 and 
accompanying text (discussing how Lane affected First Amendment retaliation claim case law); 
 8 See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462 (reviewing historic procedural treatment of the inquiry into 
protected status of public employees’ speech). 
 9 See infra notes 18–36 and accompanying text. 
 10 See infra notes 37–57 and accompanying text. 
 11 See infra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
2018] Frustrating Public Employees’ Right to a Jury Trial 85 
in Mayhew that the inquiry into protected speech remains one of law.12 Part 
III argues that, in Mayhew, the Sixth Circuit properly interpreted a recent 
Supreme Court case as not disrupting its tradition of treating the protected 
status of speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim as a question of 
law.13 Finally, Part III argues that the Mayhew holding will nonetheless un-
fairly impair public employees’ right to a jury trial.14 
I. BACKGROUND 
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects a person’s right 
to free expression from unwarranted government interference.15 Section A 
of this Part examines the development of the protection of this right and, in 
particular, the U.S. Supreme Court’s evolving free speech doctrine for pub-
lic employees.16 Section B of this Part describes the different approaches 
taken by the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding whether the pro-
tected status of public employees’ speech is purely one of law or one of 
mixed law and fact.17 
A. The Supreme Court’s Public Employee Free Speech Framework 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows public employees to sue employers who, un-
der the color of state law, deprive them of their First Amendment right to 
free speech.18 Litigants in most § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suits 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See infra notes 70–84 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 96–105 and accompanying text. 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I.; see also Erika Schutzman, Note, We Need Professional Help: Ad-
vocating for A Consistent Standard of Review When Regulations of Professional Speech Implicate 
the First Amendment, 56 B.C. L. REV. 2019, 2024–30, 2047–55 (2015) (describing the First 
Amendment and the professional speech doctrine). The First Amendment is a limit only on the 
federal government. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Through the Fourteenth Amendment, state and local 
governments are also prohibited from infringing on constitutional rights. Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
16 See infra notes 18–36 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 37–57 and accompanying text. 
 18 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing cause of action against any person who, under the 
color of state law, deprives an individual of any “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and [federal] law”). Its purpose is to deter state actors from using that title to infringe 
on individuals’ federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to those individuals when state 
actors are not deterred. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 1996) (providing defini-
tion and purpose of § 1983). Section1983 was passed as § 1of the Civil Rights Act of 1871. Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § I, 17 Stat. 13. The legislation remained relatively untouched until the 
Supreme Court, in 1961, exempted municipalities from liability under § 1983. Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). Subsequently, in 1978, the Supreme Court overruled the part of Monroe 
that exempted municipalities. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978). In 1980, in 
Maine v. Thiboutot, the Supreme Court held that § 1983 could not only be used to enforce viola-
86 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
have a right to a jury trial.19 To establish a successful § 1983 First Amend-
ment retaliation claim, a public employee must show: 1) the employee en-
gaged in speech or conduct that was protected by the Constitution; 2) the 
employee suffered an adverse action likely to deter an ordinary person from 
continuing to engage in that protected speech or conduct; and 3) the exist-
ence of a causal connection between the first two elements.20  
 The first element lacked clarity until Pickering v. Board of Education 
was decided in 1968.21 In Pickering, the Supreme Court developed a two-
step inquiry to determine whether the first element of a § 1983 First 
Amendment retaliation claim has been met.22 The first step asks whether the 
employee’s speech addresses a matter of “public concern.”23 If the speech 
does not address a matter of public concern, it is not protected by the First 
Amendment, and the employer prevails.24 If the speech does address a mat-
                                                                                                                           
tions of federal constitutional rights, but also to enforce violations of federal statutory rights. 448 
U.S. 1, 4 (1980). 
 19 U.S. CONST. amend. VII; City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 
U.S. 687, 707–21 (1999) (holding that § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suits typically invoke 
the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment). 
 20 Westmoreland, 662 F.3d at 718; Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 
255 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 588 (6th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that a 
causal connection is present when the negative action taken against employee is motivated or 
substantially caused by his or her protected speech). Whether an adverse employment action was 
substantially motivated by an employee’s protected speech is a question of fact for the jury. Bass 
v. Richards, 308 F.3d 1081, 1088 (10th Cir. 2002). If the speech is unprotected the analysis stops 
there and the causal connection question is not heard by the jury. See id. (explaining the steps in 
the Pickering analysis). In the Sixth Circuit, government acts of retaliation need not be severe or 
of a certain kind to be considered an “adverse action” likely to deter an ordinary person from con-
tinuing to engage in the protected speech. See Benison v. Ross, 765 F.3d 649, 660 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(holding that a decision by a state university to file suit against a professor to recover sabbatical 
compensation constituted an “adverse action”); Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 
545 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding the decision by the City Attorney’s Office to terminate public record 
coordinator’s employment constituted an “adverse action”). 
21 See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (finding a public employee’s speech to be protected 
by the First Amendment where the speech addresses a matter of public concern and the employ-
ee’s interest in speaking outweighs the government’s interest as an employer in promoting effi-
ciency). 
 22 Id. at 574. 
 23 Id. Since Pickering, a wide variety of matters have been considered to be of public concern. 
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987) (holding that a statement made about an 
attempt on the President’s life in the course of a conversation addressing policies of the Presi-
dent’s administration touched on matter of public concern); Victor v. McElveen, 150 F.3d 451, 
456 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a police officer’s comments at a work meeting about racial dis-
crimination touched on matter of public concern); Am. Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv., 
830 F.2d 294, 302 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding postal employee’s comments about right-to-work 
legislation touched on matter of public concern). 
 24 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574; see Hesse v. Bd. of Educ., 848 F.2d 748, 751–52 (7th Cir. 
1988) (holding that a teacher’s defense of his teaching methods and appropriate discipline for 
students was merely personal-grievance speech); Gomez v. Tex. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental 
Retardation, 794 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding speech by an employee about the 
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ter of public concern, the employee’s interest in speaking is weighed against 
the employer’s interests in promoting efficiency.25 
The Supreme Court refined this test in 1983, in Connick v. Myers, rea-
soning that a government employee can only pass the threshold “public 
concern” step when the employee speaks: 1) as a citizen; and 2) upon mat-
ters of public concern rather than “matters only of personal interest.”26 In 
Connick, the Court also succinctly clarified that this two-step inquiry into 
the protected status of the speech is purely legal.27 A question of law is an 
issue that concerns the direct application of the law to already determined 
facts, and is reserved for the court and not submitted to the jury.28 In con-
trast, juries typically resolve mixed questions of law and fact.29 Their factu-
                                                                                                                           
treatment at a mental health facility did not touch on a matter of public concern); Yoggerst v. 
Hedges, 739 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding a public employee’s statement that it was 
“good news” that her boss was terminated did not touch on matter of public concern). 
 25 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. This balancing test takes into consideration that the govern-
ment, as an employer, has interests in controlling the speech of its employees that differ from its 
interests in controlling the speech of the public at large. Id. at 568. The Eighth Circuit has indicat-
ed that whenever the balancing process must be invoked to determine whether the plaintiff’s 
speech was protected by the First Amendment, any underlying factual disputes should be submit-
ted to the jury through special interrogatories or special verdict forms. Shands v. City of Kennett, 
993 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 26 Connick, 461 U.S. at 143. In Connick, an assistant district attorney, unhappy with her su-
pervisor’s decision to transfer her to another division, circulated an intra-office questionnaire 
requesting her co-workers to share their views on office policies and morale. Id. at 141. She was 
subsequently fired. Id. Finding that, with the exception of the final question, the questionnaire 
touched on internal workplace grievances rather than on matters of public concern, the Court stat-
ed that no Pickering balancing was required. Id. at 146. The Court adopted the vague standard 
found in the Restatement of Torts, which deals with invasion of privacy, to further clarify “public 
concern.” Id. at 143 n.5 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (Am. Law. Inst. 
1977)) (stating standard to determine whether employees’ expression is meaningful to the public 
is same as standard to determine whether common-law action for invasion of privacy is present). 
 27 See id. at 148 n.7 (stating “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one of law, 
not fact”); Questions of Law, supra note 4 (defining question of law as questions for the court). 
 28 Questions of Law, supra note 4. See generally United States v. Mason, 668 F.3d 203 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (treating proper interpretation of defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as question of 
law); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (treating 
the dismissal of a declaratory judgment action for lack of jurisdiction as question of law);Servo 
Kinetics, Inc. v. Tokyo Precision Instruments Co., 475 F.3d 783 (6th Cir. 2007) (treating proper 
construction of statute as question of law). 
 29 Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, supra note 4. The terms “law” and “fact” have become 
somewhat synonymous with the respective functions of the judge and jury. Stephen A. Weiner, 
The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867, 1867–68 (1966). 
Instances of mixed questions of law and fact arise in various contexts, which include criminal 
cases with constitutional elements. See Carroll v. Renico, 475 F.3d 708, 712 (6th Cir. 2007) (treat-
ing whether the defendant was denied the right to counsel as mixed question of law and fact); 
Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 184 (5th Cir. 1999) (treating whether evidence is material un-
der the Brady doctrine as mixed question of law and fact); United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 
1441, 1445 (11th Cir. 1989) (treating whether the defendant made an incriminating statement as a 
mixed question of law and fact). Mixed questions of law and fact also arise in negligence actions 
in determining the standard of care. Randall H. Warner,All Mixed Up About Mixed Questions, 7 J. 
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al component does not involve what the law is on that given point.30 Mixed 
questions can be decided on summary judgment where, although the legal 
question remains unresolved, all material facts are undisputed.31 
The framework set out in Pickering and Connick remained largely un-
changed for twenty-three years until the Supreme Court revisited the issue 
in 2006 in Garcetti v. Ceballos.32 Although the plaintiff in Garcetti techni-
cally spoke as a citizen (rather than an employee) on a matter of public con-
cern, the Court held that the First Amendment did not protect his speech.33 
The Court narrowed the first step of the inquiry, holding that speech made 
“pursuant to” one’s duties as a public employee, rather than as a private cit-
izen, is not protected.34 The Court also held that whether a statement was 
spoken pursuant to one’s public employee duties is a “practical” question 
                                                                                                                           
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 101, 109 (2005). The question of whether something is protected by the 
Fifth Amendment has been held to be a mixed question of law and fact. See, e.g., United States v. 
Ins. Consultants of Knox, Inc., 187 F.3d 755, 759 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that whether enforce-
ment of a summons would violate Fifth Amendment privilege is a question of mixed law and 
fact). 
 30 Questions of Fact, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 31 Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, supra note 4; see Fox, 605 F.3d at 350 (stating that the 
circuit split is irrelevant where there exists no issue of material fact regarding whether the plain-
tiff’s speech is protected); see also Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (holding that the 
court has the power to determine the law and the jury has power to determine facts). 
 32 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006); Connick, 461 U.S. 138; Pickering, 391 U.S. 
at 568. 
33 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. In Garcetti, Richard Ceballos, Deputy District Attorney for the 
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office wrote a memorandum of law to his supervisors 
regarding sheriff misconduct and recommending dismissal of the prosecution on these grounds. Id. 
He later testified about it for the defense at trial when his supervisors chose to pursue the case in 
the face of his memorandum. Id. Ceballos claimed that his superiors retaliated by transferring him 
to a less desirable office location, reassigning him from his supervisory position, and denying him 
a promotion. Id. at 415. 
34 Id. Compare Reilly, 532 F.3d at 227 (holding that a police officer’s testimony for the pros-
ecution against a fellow officer was not made pursuant to his duties as a police officer and consti-
tuted protected speech as matter of mixed fact and law), and Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 513 
n.17 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that a state lottery commission employee’s complaint to state legisla-
tors about racial discrimination at the commission was not made pursuant to her work duties), with 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (holding that an assistant district attorney’s intra-office questionnaire 
requesting her co-workers’ views on office policies and morale was made pursuant to her work-
place duties and grievances rather than on matters of public concern). Garcetti consequently made 
it easier for public employers to regulate their employees’ internal job-related communications by 
greatly diminishing the type of protected workplace speech. See generally Robert Roberts, Devel-
opments in the Law: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Workplace Freedom of Speech Rights of Public 
Employees, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 662 (2007) (arguing that Garcetti may deter public employees 
from disclosing negative occurrences in government workplaces). The disagreement between the 
majority in Garcetti and the four dissenters centered upon the authority of public employers to 
regulate formal workplace communications. Id. Although the Garcetti majority stated that the 
decision would not impair the public employees’ willingness to report misconduct, id. at 662, 
some scholars have argued the contrary. Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights That Work at Work: 
From the First Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1470–74 (2007) (finding that 
Garcetti discourages employees from speaking out from fear of retaliation). 
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requiring a fact-specific inquiry.35 After Garcetti, a public employee bring-
ing a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit against his employer, must 
satisfy three elements: 1) the threshold inquiry into the Connick “matter of 
public concern”; 2) the Garcetti “pursuant to” requirement; and 3) the Pick-
ering “balancing” requirement.36 
B. The Circuit Split as to Whether the Protected Status of a Public 
Employee’s Speech Is a Question of Law or Mixed Law and Fact 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Garcetti lead to a circuit split on 
whether the inquiry into the protected status of an employee’s speech re-
mained one entirely of law, as stated in Connick, or became one of mixed 
law and fact.37 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the D.C., Fifth, Eleventh, 
and Tenth Circuits have stayed true to Connick’s declaration, while the 
Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have concluded that whether the 
worker spoke as a public employee presents a mixed question of fact and 
law.38 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424; see id. at 436 (Souter, J., dissenting) (critiquing the implications 
of the factual requirement imposed by the majority’s holding and concluding that the majority’s 
holding does not guarantee against fact-intensive litigation over whether public employee spoke as 
citizen or as public employee); Ramona L. Paetzold, When Are Public Employees Not Really Pub-
lic Employees? In the Aftermath of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 92, 96 (2008) 
(noting that Garcetti’s inquiry is fact-intensive). 
 36 Compare Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding a district attorney’s testimony regarding sher-
iff misconduct was unprotected because it was made “pursuant to” his duties as an employee), 
with Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (holding assistant district attorney’s intra-office questionnaire re-
questing her co-workers’ views on office policies and morale was unprotected because it touched 
on internal workplace grievances rather than matters of public concern). See also Pickering, 391 
U.S. at 574 (holding that a board of education’s firing of teacher for his letter to a newspaper criti-
cizing the board for their alleged mismanagement of school funds violated his First Amendment 
right to free speech, in part, because the employee’s interests in speaking outweighed the employ-
er’s interests in promoting efficiency). A public employee’s speech is protected by the First 
Amendment if it regards a matter of public concern, is not pursuant to any duties as a public em-
ployee, and the employee’s interest in speaking outweighs government’s interest as an employer. 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421; Connick, 461 U.S. at 154; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574. 
 37 Fox, 605 F.3d at 350 (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424–25 and Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille 
Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 38 Compare Posey, 546 F.3d at 1129 (holding that fact issues precluded summary judgment as 
to whether a letter to district officials and subsequent meeting to complain about allegedly inade-
quate safety and security policies at the high school constituted protected speech because the in-
quiry is one of mixed fact and law), Reilly, 532 F.3d at 227 (holding that a police officer’s truthful 
testimony constituted protected speech as matter of mixed fact and law), Davis v. Cook County, 
534 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that an employee’s memorandum was not First 
Amendment protected speech as mixed matter of fact and law), and Casey v. City of Cabool, 12 
F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an employee’s private statements critical of city offi-
cials and policies were protected speech as matter of mixed fact and law), with Charles, 522 F.3d 
at 513 n.17 (holding that an employee’s complaint to state legislators about racial discrimination 
was protected speech as matter of law), Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 
2007) (holding that an interim director’s assertion that salary differentiation between outside and 
90 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
The Supreme Court’s most recent § 1983 First Amendment retaliation 
case occurred in 2014 in Lane v. Franks.39 Lane generated further disagree-
ment among federal courts regarding the scope of Garcetti.40 In Lane, a direc-
tor of a community college youth program provided truthful sworn testimony, 
compelled by subpoena, regarding another employee’s abuse of the program’s 
work log system.41 The Court held that the First Amendment protected the 
public employee’s speech concerning information acquired through her job.42 
The Court clarified that the speech left unprotected by Garcetti was speech 
“ordinarily” within the scope of an employee’s duties, not merely concerning 
information acquired by virtue of those duties.43 Lane obfuscated the em-
ployee speech left unprotected by Garcetti because it left open the possibility 
that employees could speak as citizens in the workplace.44 Now, employees 
can claim First Amendment protection against retaliation even if they speak 
as part of their job, so long as it is not “ordinarily” part of their job.45 
When a court classifies an issue as a question of law or fact, it does so 
“ordinarily without fanfare or explanation.”46 In Connick, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                           
inside job applicants was unconstitutional was not protected speech as matter of law), Brammer-
Hoelter, 492 F.3d at 1202–03 (holding that a teacher’s grievances for speech restrictions, charter 
renewal, and school elections were protected speech as matter of law), and Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 
750, 754–55 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections employee’s com-
plaints of sexual harassment did not constitute protected speech as matter of law). 
39 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2369. 
 40 See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462 (recognizing the circuit split). Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 
580, 596 (5th Cir. 2016) (ruling that Lane’s addition of “ordinarily” did not clearly change the 
formulation used in Garcetti); Flora v. County of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 179 n.11 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(refraining from deciding whether Lane changed or clarified Garcetti). 
 41 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2375. The college president later fired the plaintiff and twenty-eight 
other employees allegedly due to budgetary constraints. Id. The plaintiff was one of the two em-
ployees who were not re-hired when the president rescinded the firings. Id. at 2376. The plaintiff 
consequently filed suit. Id.  
 42 Id. at 2379. Lane was influential because of its unanimous ruling on the First Amendment 
issue. See id. (holding unanimously that the public employee’s speech at issue was protected by 
First Amendment). Nevertheless, the Court ultimately also held that the defendant was protected 
by qualified immunity. Id. at 2381–82. 
 43 Id. at 2379. The plaintiff’s speech was protected because his job, undisputedly, did not 
ordinarily entail testifying at court. Id. The Court reasoned that if this type of speech was not pro-
tected, public employees who witnessed corruption would be torn between the obligation to testify 
truthfully and the desire to avoid retaliation and keep their jobs. Id. at 2379–80. Lane did not ad-
dress the question whether the First Amendment should protect the truthful testimony of a public 
employee where that testimony is part of the employee’s job responsibilities. Id. 
 44 See id. at 2379 (protecting public employee speech not ordinarily within scope of employ-
ees’ job); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding after Lane, the Garcetti 
exception to First Amendment protection for speech “must be read narrowly” to only include 
speech made as part of employee’s ordinary job duties). 
 45 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (protecting a community college director’s sworn testimony 
regarding another employee’s behavior). 
 46 Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial and 
Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedur-
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provided no explicit reason for its decision to label the protected status of 
speech a question of law.47 Other Courts of Appeals have similarly provided 
minimal reasoning when addressing this issue post-Lane.48 
For example, in 2016, in Anderson v. Valdez, the Fifth Circuit reasoned 
that Lane’s insertion of the qualifier “ordinarily” does not affect its ruling 
that the inquiry into the protected status of an employee’s speech is one of 
law.49 The Anderson court declared that Lane merely provided additional 
guidance regarding what speech falls within an employee’s official duties.50 
Alternatively, the Third Circuit held in 2007, in Foraker v. Chaffinch, 
that the protected status of an employee’s speech had become a mixed ques-
tion of fact and law.51 In 2014, the Third Circuit maintained this holding in 
Dougherty v. School District of Philadelphia, reasoning that Lane merely 
narrowed of the realm of employee speech left unprotected by Garcetti.52 
                                                                                                                           
al Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1018 (1986). Among the powers of the appellate courts is the 
power to classify questions as questions of law, fact, or mixed law and fact. Id. An explanation is 
not required. Id. 
 47 Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7 (stating “[t]he inquiry into protected status of speech is one of 
law, not fact”). 
 48 See Charles, 522 F.3d at 508, 512 (identifying inquiry into protected status of speech as a 
purely legal question). 
 49 Anderson, 845 F.3d at 596; Charles, 522 F.3d at 512. Following Garcetti, the Fifth Circuit 
held in 2008, in Charles v. Grief, that whether a public employee engages in protected speech is a 
“purely legal question.” Charles, 522 F.3d at 512. In Charles, an African American Texas Lottery 
Commission employee e-mailed high-ranking Commission officials and the state legislature re-
garding racial discrimination towards minority employees, including himself, and was subsequent-
ly fired. Id. at 510. The Fifth Circuit held that the employee had spoken as a citizen rather than 
pursuant to his duties as a public employee. Id. at 516. After Lane, in 2016 in Anderson v. Valdez, 
an applicant for a law clerk position alleged that a judge had told his colleague not to hire the 
applicant in retaliation for reporting the judge’s alleged malfeasance. Anderson, 845 F.3d at 586–
88. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court for the Southern District of Texas, which had 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state claim in part because the speech was 
protected. Id. at 602. 
 50 Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2369; Anderson, 845 F.3d at 596. 
 51 Foraker v. Chaffinch, 501 F.3d 231, 240–41 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated by Borough of 
Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 383 (2011)). In Foraker, instructors in the Firearms Training 
Unit of the Delaware State Police reported hazardous conditions at a firing range to their superiors 
and the State Auditor, and were subsequently placed on light duty. Id. at 233–34. The Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the District Court of Delaware’s dismissal, reasoning that the officers were acting 
within their official job duties, as a mixed question of fact and law, when they reported their con-
cerns. Id. at 240. 
 52 Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014). In Dougherty, the 
Third Circuit had occasion to consider the implications of Lane for a school district employee who 
was terminated after saying to a local newspaper that the district superintendent had improperly 
skirted competitive bidding rules and steered a lucrative contract toward a personal acquaintance. 
Id. at 984–85. Because the employee’s routine job responsibilities did not include reporting mis-
conduct to the press or to the school board, the Third Circuit ruled his speech was not within the 
scope of his employment merely because its content related to his job duties. Id. at 988, 990. More 
recently, in 2017, in De Ritis v. McGarrigle, the Third Circuit held that a public defender was 
speaking as an employee, rather than a citizen, when he made in-court statements to attorneys and 
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The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that the determination as to 
whether a public employee’s speech is protected is a question of law.53 For 
example, after Garcetti, the court reasoned in 2012, in Dixon v. University of 
Toledo, that a human resources employee’s op-ed column was unprotected as 
a matter of law.54 
The Sixth Circuit had not specifically addressed whether Lane abrogated 
Connick’s holding and subsequent Sixth Circuit case law that the protected 
status of an employee’s speech is a question of law.55 The Sixth Circuit did, 
however, characterize Lane as “narrowing” the scope of speech left unpro-
tected by Garcetti.56 In 2015, in Boulton v. Swanson, the Sixth Circuit in-
ferred this narrowing from the Supreme Court’s addition of “ordinarily” as a 
modifier to the scope of an employer’s job duties, and from its admonishment 
that speech is not transformed into employee speech simply because it con-
cerns information acquired by virtue of the speaker’s public employment.57 
                                                                                                                           
judges that he was being punished for taking too many cases to trial. 861 F.3d 444, 453 (3d Cir. 
2017). The court cited Garcetti as requiring it to make a “practical” inquiry, and Lane as requiring 
it to assess whether the speech was ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties. Id. at 453. 
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff’s speech was unprotected as a mixed matter 
of law and fact. Id.  
 53 See, e.g., Dixon, 702 F.3d at 274 (holding that the protected status of public employees’ 
speech is question of law); Westmoreland, 662 F.3d at 718 (same); see also Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 
1047 (relying on Connick, among others, for this proposition). Notably, many post-Garcetti cases 
did not involve disputed material facts, and therefore the issue of whether the protected status of 
an employee’s speech is a question of law or fact was irrelevant for purposes of summary judg-
ment. See Holbrook v. Dumas, 658 F. App’x 280, 284 n.3 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding the issue as a 
matter of law was appropriate because the material facts were undisputed); Dixon, 702 F.3d 269, 
275, 278 (stating that “parties do not dispute whether plaintiff spoke on a matter of public con-
cern”); Westmoreland, 662 F.3d 714, 718 (treating the protected nature of speech as question of 
law where there was no factual dispute regarding what was said). When these cases were decided, 
eight of the sixteen Sixth Circuit judges were nominated by President George W. Bush. Eirich, 
Kevin, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA (Sept. 9, 2017), bal-
lotpedia.org/wiki/index.php?title=United_States_Court_of_Appeals_for_the_Sixth_Circuit&oldid
=6925684 [https:////perma.cc/28PW-93GW]. One was nominated by President George H.W. Bush, 
making a majority of the judges on the circuit affiliated with the Republican party. Id. Since then, 
two more judges, nominated by Donald Trump, have joined the already predominantly Republican 
Sixth Circuit. Id. 
 54 Dixon, 702 F.3d at 271. In Dixon, the interim Associate Vice President for Human Re-
sources at the University of Toledo wrote an op-ed column in the local press that criticized com-
parisons between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements. Id. at 271–73. The plaintiff was fired 
shortly after she wrote the op-ed column. Id. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s op-ed col-
umn was on a political or policy issue and therefore unprotected as a matter of law. Id. at 277. The 
Sixth Circuit did not find Garcetti’s use of “practical” and fact-specific approach to the inquiry 
into the protected status of speech as reason to depart from their holding that the inquiry was a 
question of law. Dixon, 702 F.3d at 277. 
 55 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462. 
 56 See Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534 (holding that after Lane, the Garcetti exception to First 
Amendment protection for speech “must be read narrowly” to only include speech made as part of 
an employee’s ordinary job duties). 
 57 Id.; Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463. 
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II. MAYHEW V. TOWN OF SMYRNA 
It is within this shifting landscape that the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit recently addressed a wastewater-treatment plant employ-
ee’s § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against the Town of Smyrma 
and its city manager in Mayhew v. Town of Symrna.58 Section A of this Part 
provides the procedural history and a factual overview of Mayhew.59 Sec-
tion B of this Part examines and discusses the Sixth Circuit’s holding in 
Mayhew that the inquiry into protected speech remains one of law.60  
A. The Facts of Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna 
Mayhew, the plaintiff, had been a long-time employee of the plant and, 
as the lab’s supervisor, oversaw the collection and analysis of samples to 
comply with reporting requirements.61 He was terminated after reporting 
violations of federal and state regulatory requirements at the plant and voic-
ing concerns about the town’s hiring practices.62 
Specifically, Mayhew had reported concerns that the plant’s chief op-
erator was engaging in questionable conduct relating to the plant’s collec-
tion, recording, and reporting of its water samples to the then-plant manag-
er.63 In addition, Mayhew complained about the town’s hiring practices fol-
lowing the promotion of the city manager’s nephew to chief operator and 
the offending chief operator to plant manager.64 At a meeting at city hall 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 456, 459 (6th Cir. 2017). Mayhew filed suit under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which authorizes public employees to file suit for improper employer retaliation 
against public employers. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
 59 See infra notes 61–69 and accompanying text. 
 60 See infra notes 70–84 and accompanying text. 
 61 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 461. The plant was subject to extensive regulation by the EPA and the 
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“TDEC”), including various water-
quality permits and reporting requirements under the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System. Id. at 460. As part of his job, Mayhew had to obtain a TDEC “Grade 
IV” wastewater-treatment certification, which required him to “comply with the laws, rules, per-
mit requirements, or orders of any governmental agency or court which govern the water supply 
system or the wastewater system he/she operates.” Id. 
 62 Id. at 461. This was not the first time that the Sixth Circuit had adjudicated a § 1983 action 
brought by employees who had been terminated from their wastewater treatment plant jobs. See 
Charvat v. E. Ohio Reg’l Wastewater Auth., 246 F.3d 607, 617–18 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that 
letters written by employees of a wastewater treatment plant to the Ohio Environmental Protection 
Agency and to the authority’s board of trustees, which reported environmental violations at 
wastewater treatment plant, were protected speech). 
 63 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 459. After the plant manager’s resignation, Mayhew began escalating 
his reports up the chain of command. Id. Mayhew reported his concerns to the plant manager’s 
supervisors who relayed Mayhew’s complaints to the city manager, defendant Harry Gill. Id. 
 64 Id. Specifically, Mayhew sent an email that was forwarded to the city manager. Id. It is not 
uncommon for § 1983 claims to turn on whether an employee’s e-mails, which were sent to his or 
her supervisors, involve a matter of public concern. See e.g., LeFande v. District of Columbia, 841 
94 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
scheduled to address his complaint, Mayhew was asked whether he could 
work with the chief operator, and Mayhew indicated that he would put forth 
his best effort.65 The city manager fired Mayhew at the end of the meeting, 
however, because he felt Mayhew was not genuinely willing to work with 
the chief operator.66 
Mayhew subsequently filed suit, alleging that the town and city man-
ager violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Tennessee Public Protection Act (“TPPA”) by terminating his employment 
in retaliation for his reporting activities.67 Following discovery, the District 
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted summary judgment in 
favor of the town and city manager on Mayhew’s § 1983 First Amendment 
retaliation claim, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his 
state law TPPA claim.68 Mayhew re-filed his TPPA claim in Tennessee state 
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 485, 495 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that a police officer’s e-mails that ridiculed his superiors’ 
handling of a public disturbance did not involve a matter of public concern); Schwartz v. Ander-
son, 98 F. Supp. 3d 460, 475 (D. Conn. 2015) (holding that a state veterinarian employee’s e-mail 
to a state university official and members of the university body regarding use of a lab’s controlled 
substances to euthanize animals did not involve a matter of public concern); Anderson v. Kent 
State Univ., 804 F. Supp. 2d 575, 584 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (holding that e-mails by a carpenter at 
Kent State University to other university employees regarding the university’s employee vacation 
policy did not comment on matters of public concern). 
 65 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 459. The city manager accused Mayhew of being insubordinate and 
“bitter against [the chief operator],” to which Mayhew responded: “No, sir. I’m not bitter towards 
him. This has nothing to do with personal issues. It has to do with what I reported.” Id. 
 66 Id. The city manager felt that “there wasn’t really a full declaration that [Mayhew] was 
willing to work with [the chief operator]. [Mayhew] said, I would do my best”; and that “his work 
ethics could be [compromised] if he had to work with [the chief operator].” Id. 
 67 See Brief of Appellant at 10, Mayhew, 856 F.3d 459 (No. 16–5103), 2016 WL 3680247, at 
*10 [hereinafter Mayhew Appellant’s Brief] (arguing that the court should hold that the question 
of whether speech is constitutionally protected is one of mixed law and fact or purely fact and that 
Mayhew’s speech was constitutionally protected). Specifically, Mayhew filed suit against the 
Town of Smyrna and Gill approximately one month after he was discharged, raising the following 
claims: (1) a claim for violation of Mayhew’s First Amendment rights based on allegations that 
the defendants terminated him in retaliation for protected speech, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
and (2) a claim for violation of the Tennessee Public Protection Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-
304 (2015), based on allegations that the defendants terminated Mayhew in retaliation for his 
refusal to remain silent about, or participate in, violations of federal and state laws and regulations. 
Mayhew Appellant’s Brief, supra. at *10. 
 68 Mayhew 856 F.3d at 466. The district court reasoned that given Mayhew’s explicit job 
responsibilities to oversee the plant’s water-sampling regime and report any issues regarding that 
regime, his reports of Noble’s misconduct did not involve an issue of public concern. Mayhew v. 
Town of Smyrna, No. 3:14–CV–1653, 2016 WL 128524, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 12, 2016), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, 856 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2017). The district court dismissed Mayhew’s claim 
regarding his complaints about the town’s hiring practices on procedural grounds, but also ruled it 
would have failed on the merits because that speech was not protected. Id. at *10. In the court’s 
view, Mayhew’s e-mail did not address a matter of public concern, but instead aired an internal 
employee grievance. Id. at *11. Typically, the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction allows a fed-
eral court, in its discretion, to exercise jurisdiction over claims that it does not ordinarily have 
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court and appealed the district court’s dismissal of his First Amendment 
claim to the Sixth Circuit. 69 
B. The Sixth Circuit Holds the Analysis as to the Protected Status of a 
Public Employee’s Speech Remains a Question of Law 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that a public employee alleging First 
Amendment retaliation must satisfy: 1) the Connick “matter of public con-
cern” requirement; 2) the Garcetti “pursuant to” requirement; and 3) the 
Pickering “balancing” requirement.70 The Sixth Circuit then turned to the 
procedural question: whether the Supreme Court’s most recent § 1983 First 
Amendment retaliation case, Lane v. Franks, abrogated its decision in Con-
nick v. Myers and the Sixth Circuit’s subsequent cases holding that that the 
protected status of an employee’s speech is entirely a question of law.71 
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged the circuit split caused by Garcetti v. 
Ceballos and discussed its subsequent analysis of the protected status of an 
employer’s conduct as one solely of law.72 Mayhew argued that, as a result 
of Lane, whether a public employee’s speech is protected is now a question 
of fact or mixed law and fact.73 He also argued that the use of the term “or-
                                                                                                                           
authority to hear when those issues are inextricably intertwined with matters over which the dis-
trict court properly and independently has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012). 
 69 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 461. 
 70 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (holding that a district attorney’s testi-
mony regarding the sheriff’s misconduct was unprotected because it was made pursuant to his 
duties as employee); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (holding that an assistant dis-
trict attorney’s intra-office questionnaire requesting her co-workers’ views on office policies and 
morale was unprotected because it touched on internal workplace grievances rather than matters of 
public concern); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) (holding that a board of 
education’s firing of a teacher for his letter to a newspaper criticizing the board for their alleged 
mismanagement of school funds violated his First Amendment right to free speech, in part, be-
cause the employee’s interests in speaking outweighed the employer’s interests in promoting effi-
ciency); Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462 (quoting Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 337–38 
(6th Cir. 2010)). 
 71 Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2379 (2014) (stating that speech is not transformed into 
employee speech simply because it concerns information acquired by virtue of the speaker’s pub-
lic employment and adding “ordinarily” as a modifier to the scope of an employer’s job duties); 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.7 (stating that “[t]he inquiry into the protected status of speech is one 
of law, not fact”); Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 462 (quoting Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. of 
Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2010)) (citing the circuit split). 
 72 Mayhew, 856 F.3d 462–63; Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(holding that the school administrator’s op-ed column in local press that criticized comparisons 
between the civil-rights and gay-rights movements was on a political or policy issue and therefore 
unprotected as a matter of law); Westmoreland v. Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that a firefighter’s critical comments of the city council constituted protected speech as 
matter of law); see also Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1047–48 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding 
that a firefighter’s testimony at an arbitration about colleague’s discipline by department was 
about a private matter and unprotected as matter of law). 
 73 Mayhew Appellant’s Brief, supra note 67, at 23. Mayhew cited Lane’s “unprecedented” use 
of “ordinary” nine times for this proposition. Reply Brief of Appellant at 4, Mayhew, 856 F.3d 459 
96 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
dinarily” in Lane requires a factual inquiry into whether the speech was 
within the scope of the employee’s usual duties.74 
The Sixth Circuit recognized that Lane narrows Garcetti by reason of 
the Supreme Court’s addition of the word “ordinarily” to modify the scope of 
an employer’s job duties.75 The court further inferred Lane’s limiting effect 
from the Supreme Court’s caution that speech is not transformed into em-
ployee speech simply because it concerns information pursuant to the speak-
er’s employment duties.76 Yet the Sixth Circuit pointed out that because Lane 
did not explicitly refer to the circuit split, overrule Connick, or otherwise ad-
dress the issue, the court therefore had no reason to depart from precedent.77 
The Sixth Circuit also rejected Mayhew’s argument that prior cases re-
quired a finding that the question was one of fact or mixed law and fact.78 The 
                                                                                                                           
(No. 16-5103), 2016 WL 5921704, at *4 [hereinafter Mayhew Appellant’s Reply Brief]. Mayhew 
also cited to the Sixth Circuit’s 2015 decision in Boulton v. Swanson that recognized Lane’s use of 
“ordinarily” to modify the scope of an employee’s job duties as narrowing the speech left unpro-
tected by Garcetti. Id. at *1 (citing Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 2015) (quot-
ing Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 990 (3d Cir. 2014))). Lastly, Mayhew cited 
the opinions of other Circuit Courts of Appeals that have held the inquiry into whether an employ-
ee’s speech is protected was treated as a question of mixed law and fact. Id. at *2–3 (citing Dahlia 
v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1072–73 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)) and Flora v. County of Luzerne, 
776 F.3d 169, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 74 Mayhew Appellant’s Brief, supra, note 67, at *1–2. Mayhew contended that determining 
whether his complaints of town hiring practices and reports of regulatory violations were part of 
his “ordinary” job duties necessitated a trier of fact. Id. at *1–2. According to Mayhew, the de-
fendants and the district court relied on his written job description and “did not even ask Mayhew 
about [his job duties] at his deposition.” Mayhew Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 73, at *2. 
Mayhew pointed out that, in Garcetti, the Court had warned that formal job descriptions are not 
accurate depictions of the duties an employee is actually expected to complete. Id. (citing Garcet-
ti, 547 U.S. at 424–25). Instead of looking at his formal job description, Mayhew urged the court 
to have the jury make a factual determination as to whether his job duties included complaining 
about town hiring and reporting regulatory violations. Id. 
 75 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463 (citing Boulton, 795 F.3d at 534). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 464. The court explicitly asserted that “[i]t is not our prerogative to set this binding 
precedent aside until the Supreme Court tells us we must.” Id. (citing Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 
1, 2 (2016) (per curiam)); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 207 (1997) (warning lower 
courts against “conclud[ing the Supreme Court’s] more recent cases have, by implication, over-
ruled an earlier precedent”). 
 78 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463. Mayhew cited several cases from other circuits. See, e.g., Coomes 
v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding a teacher’s 
communication with administrators about the failure of the school district to implement individu-
alized education programs and its mismanagement of emotional-behavioral disorders program was 
unprotected as a mixed question of law and fact); Flora, 776 F.3d at 179–80 (holding that whether 
a former chief public defender’s ordinary job duties encompassed making statements about a law-
suit relating to lack of funding for state public defender, or about incomplete expungements of 
juvenile convictions, was mixed question of law and fact and due to disputed material facts could 
not be decided on summary judgment); Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1072, 1077–78 (holding that a police 
detective’s meeting with Internal Affairs in connection with an investigation into police abuse was 
protected as question of mixed law and fact); Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 546 
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court characterized the decisions cited by the employee as non-binding be-
cause they either relied on pre-Lane authority or were decided by other cir-
cuits.79 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit held that the inquiry into the protected 
status of speech made by a public employee would remain a question of law 
under Lane.80 
Returning to the substantive component of the employee’s § 1983 First 
Amendment retaliation claim, the Sixth Circuit held that the District Court 
did not err in granting summary judgment for the defendants regarding the 
Mayhew’s reports of regulatory violations.81 The court reasoned that Mayhew 
spoke as a public employee, rather than as a citizen when he reported ques-
tionable conduct related to the plant’s water samples. The Sixth Circuit also 
reversed in part and remanded the part of Mayhew’s claim relating to com-
plaints about the town’s hiring practices.82 The court reasoned that Mayhew 
spoke on a matter of public concern when he questioned these decisions made 
by management.83 Thus, on remand, the District Court was tasked with adju-
                                                                                                                           
F.3d 1121, 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that an issue of material fact remained as to 
whether a high school employee wrote and delivered his letter to school officials, complaining of 
inadequate safety and security policies at the high school, was pursuant to his duties as a security 
specialist, thus precluding summary judgment). Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (listing cases that May-
hew cited to); Mayhew Appellant’s Brief, supra note 67, at *31 (citing cases). 
 79 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464. Mayhew argued that the cases he cited required the Sixth Circuit to 
revisit its holding that the inquiry into protected speech remained one of law after Lane. Mayhew 
Appellant’s Brief, supra, note 67, at *1–2. Nevertheless, Mayhew had relied on two cases decided 
before Lane. See, e.g., Dahlia, 735 F.3d at 1079 (holding, before Lane was decided, that protected 
status of public employees’ speech is one of fact); Posey, 546 F.3d at 1129, 1131 (holding, before 
Lane was decided, that protected status of public employees’ speech is one of mixed law and fact). 
Mayhew had also relied on decisions from other circuits. See, e.g., Coomes, 816 F.3d at 1260, 
1264 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that the protected status of public employees’ speech is one of 
mixed law and fact); Flora, 776 F.3d at 175 (holding that protected status of public employees’ 
speech is one of mixed law and fact). 
 80 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463. The Sixth Circuit joined the D.C., Fifth, Eleventh, and Tenth 
Circuits by resolving this procedural question in favor of the employer defendants. See Charles v. 
Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 512, 516 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding an employee’s complaint to state legislators 
about racial discrimination was protected speech as matter of law); Wilburn v. Robinson, 480 F.3d 
1140, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding an interim director’s assertion that salary differentiation 
between outside and inside job applicants was unconstitutional was not protected speech as matter 
of law); Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 1198–99, 1202, 1208 
(10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a teacher’s grievances for speech restrictions, charter renewal, and 
school elections were protected speech as matter of law); Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 754–55 
(11th Cir. 1993) (holding an employee of the State Department of Corrections’ complaints of 
sexual harassment did not constitute protected speech as matter of law). 
 81 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 463. 
 82 Id. at 466, 469. 
 83 Id. at 469. The court determined that Mayhew’s complaints about the town’s hiring process 
constituted more than a personal grievance about his supervisor, and instead involved the hiring 
process in general, which was a matter of public concern. Id. The court’s decision was similar to 
other cases in which it found protected speech outside the scope of an employee’s job duties. 
Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, 695 F.3d 531, 543–44 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that a city public 
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dicating the substantive issue of whether the Town’s termination of employ-
ment after Mayhew spoke out about its hiring practices violated his First 
Amendment rights.84 
III. THE AFTERMATH OF MAYHEW V. TOWN OF SMYRNA 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s resolution of the pro-
cedural issue of whether the protected status of public employees’ speech is 
one of law or mixed law and fact in 2017, in Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 
has far reaching consequences.85 Section A of this Part argues that, in May-
hew, the Sixth Circuit properly interpreted a recent U.S. Supreme Court 
case as not disrupting its tradition of treating the protected status of speech 
in a First Amendment retaliation claim as a question of law.86 Section B of 
this Part argues that the Mayhew holding will nonetheless unfairly impair 
public employees’ right to a jury trial.87 
A. The Sixth Circuit Properly Held That the Protected Status of Speech Is a 
Question of Law Within Its Jurisdiction Post-Lane 
In Mayhew, the Sixth Circuit properly held that the protected status of 
speech in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim remains a question of 
law within its jurisdiction.88 The court had to reach this holding because the 
question before it was not whether the inquiry into the protected status of 
speech should have remained one of law immediately following the Su-
preme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, but instead, the issue 
                                                                                                                           
records coordinator’s comments to various city officials about potential corruption within the 
office were made as a citizen because she was not asked to provide her opinion on the alleged 
misconduct or to investigate it, and speaking with individuals outside of her department was not 
part of her official duties). 
84 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 466, 469. 
 85 See Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369, 2369 (2014) (holding that the speech left unprotected 
by Garcetti was speech “ordinarily” within the scope of an employee’s duties, not merely con-
cerning information acquired by virtue of those duties); Mayhew v. Town of Smyrna, 856 F.3d 
456, 463–64 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that the inquiry into the protected status of speech in a First 
Amendment retaliation claim is a question of law); infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text (ar-
guing that, in Mayhew, the Sixth Circuit properly interpreted Lane as not disrupting its tradition of 
treating the protected status of speech in a First Amendment retaliation claim as a question of 
law). 
 86 See infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text.  
 87 See infra notes 96–105 and accompanying text. 
88 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 456; see Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (protecting public employee speech 
not ordinarily within scope of employees’ job); Boulton v. Swanson, 795 F.3d 526, 534 (6th Cir. 
2015); Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 274 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding protected status of 
public employees’ speech remains question of law post-Lane). 
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was limited to whether the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Lane v. 
Franks subsequently transformed the inquiry into one of fact.89 
There was no viable argument that Lane’s addition of “ordinarily” as a 
modifier to the scope of an employer’s job duties procedurally transformed 
the inquiry.90 First, Lane did not explicitly address the procedural aspects of 
the inquiry into the protected status of speech.91 The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Lane for the limited purpose of determining whether a public 
employee may suffer adverse employment consequences for speech outside 
his ordinary job duties.92 Second, the Sixth Circuit had already set a prece-
dent in previous cases, such as in 2015, in Stinebaugh v. City of Wapa-
koneta, and in 2012, in Dixon v. University of Toledo, that Lane’s language 
                                                                                                                           
 89 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (holding that the speech left unprotected by Garcetti was 
speech “ordinarily” within the scope of an employee’s duties, not merely concerning information 
acquired by virtue of those duties); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (holding that 
the inquiry into the status of public employees’ speech is a practical and fact-specific inquiry); 
Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (holding the inquiry into the protected status of speech in a First 
Amendment retaliation claim is a question of law). The Sixth Circuit had already held that the 
inquiry into the protected status of speech remained one of law after Garcetti. See Dixon, 702 F.3d 
at 274 (holding school administrator’s speech unprotected as a matter of law); Westmoreland v. 
Sutherland, 662 F.3d 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding a firefighter’s comments constituted pro-
tected speech as matter of law); see also Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1047 (holding a 
firefighter’s testimony at arbitration unprotected as matter of law). In Mayhew, the Sixth Circuit 
was constricted to addressing the plaintiff’s argument that Lane’s use of “ordinary” to modify 
what fell within an employee’s job duties required a departure from treating this inquiry as a ques-
tion of law. See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (holding that Lane did not transform the inquiry into the 
protected status of public employees’ speech into question of mixed law and fact). 
 90 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2379 (holding that Garcetti requires an inquiry into whether the 
public employee’s speech concerned a matter ordinarily within the scope of his or her duties); 
Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that Lane transformed the inquiry into 
the protected status of public employees’ speech into question of mixed law and fact); Mayhew 
Appellant’s Brief, supra note 67, at 23 (arguing Lane transformed the inquiry into the protected 
status of public employees’ speech into question of mixed law and fact). 
 91 See generally Lane, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (holding that the speech left unprotected by Garcetti 
was speech “ordinarily” within the scope of an employee’s duties and treating this inquiry as one 
of law without analysis). Foremost, Lane did not overtly mention the issue of whether the inquiry 
into the protected status of speech is a question of law or mixed question of law and fact. Id. at 
2376. The terms “question of law,” “question of fact,” “mixed question of fact and law,” “fact-
specific inquiry,” “practical,” nor any other related procedural terms appear within the text of 
Lane. Id. 
 92 Id. Specifically, the plaintiff’s petition for certiorari asked the Court to decide only whether 
truthful sworn testimony that is not a part of an employee’s ordinary job responsibilities is citizen 
speech on a matter of public concern. Id. at 2378 n.4; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lane v. 
Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (No. 13-483), 2013 WL 5652570, at 6 (presenting question as “Is the 
government categorically free under the First Amendment to retaliate against a public employee 
for truthful sworn testimony that was compelled by subpoena and was not a part of the employee’s 
ordinary job responsibilities?”). Accordingly, Lane did not address the procedural aspect of the 
inquiry into the protected status of employees’ speech under the First Amendment. See Lane, 134 
S. Ct. at 2378 n.4 (limiting its holding to whether truthful sworn testimony that is not a part of an 
employee’s ordinary job responsibilities is protected by the First Amendment). 
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did not have an effect on its decision to treat the inquiry as a question of 
law.93 Lastly, the Mayhew court would have reached the same holding even if 
it had found the inquiry into the protected status of speech was a question of 
mixed fact and law.94 The court relied on undisputed facts to determine that 
the plaintiff’s reports on regulatory violations were protected, and the First 
Amendment did not protect complaints about the town’s hiring practices.95 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Holding That the Inquiry into the Protected  
Status of Speech Is One of Law Undermines the First  
Amendment Rights of Public Employees 
Because the right to a jury trial usually exists in § 1983 First Amend-
ment retaliation suits, the Mayhew holding impairs employees’ customary 
right to a jury trial.96 In this sense, the Sixth Circuit’s holding, although ne-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Stinebaugh v. City of Wapakoneta, 630 F. App’x. 522, 525 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that the 
inquiry into protected status of public employees’ speech is a question of law); Dixon, 702 F.3d at 
274 (stating that the Sixth Circuit has consistently held the inquiry into protected status of a public 
employees’ speech is a question of law and refusing to depart from such precedent). In a similar 
fashion, other circuits have also refrained from holding that Lane has transformed the procedural 
aspects of the inquiry into whether speech is protected; circuits that held the inquiry is one of law 
have continued to do so while circuits that held the inquiry is a mixed one of fact and law have 
also continued to do so post-Lane. Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 596 (5th Cir. 2016) (ruling 
that Lane’s addition of “ordinarily” did not clearly change formulation used in Garcetti); 
Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 990 (ruling Lane may merely narrow the speech left unprotected by Gar-
cetti’s holding). The only exception occurred in 2015 in Flora v. County of Luzerne, which did not 
rely on Lane. 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015). In Flora, the Third Circuit determined that wheth-
er a particular incident of speech is made within a particular plaintiff’s job duties is a mixed ques-
tion of fact and law; and more specifically, the scope and content of a plaintiff’s job responsibili-
ties is a question of fact but the ultimate constitutional significance is a question of law. Id. The 
Flora court did not cite Lane in support of this proposition and relied almost entirely on pre-Lane 
cases, offering no suggestion that Lane affected this holding. Id. 
 94 See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 469 (relying on undisputed facts); Brief of Defendants at 37–38, 
Mayhew, 856 F.3d 456 (No. 16–5103), 2016 WL 4761022, at *37–38 (arguing the procedural 
question regarding the protected status of public employees’ speech immaterial to case’s disposi-
tion). 
 95 Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 459–60. The District Court found that it was undisputed between the 
parties that Mayhew’s job duties included the requirement that Mayhew “report any appropriate 
situations and accidents” regarding federal and state regulations “immediately to management.” 
Id. at 459–60. The District Court also found that Mayhew never disputed that Smyrna required 
him, as the Lab Supervisor, to comply with all permit and reporting requirements, notify TDEC of 
any conditions that are “violative” of water quality standards, and exercise reasonable care to 
prepare reports that do not contain inaccurate data.” Id. at 459–60. Furthermore, Mayhew did not 
argue a reasonable jury could have found that his job scope and duties were different than those 
determined by the District Court. Id. at 459–60. Therefore, the judge would have independently 
reached the same holding because there were no genuine issues of material fact for a jury to find at 
trial. See Questions of Law, supra note 4 (defining questions of law as questions for the court); 
Questions of Fact, supra note 30 (defining questions of fact as questions for the fact-finder). 
 96 See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707–11 (1999) 
(holding that a § 1983 action seeking legal relief guarantees the right to trial by jury under Seventh 
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cessitated by precedent, nonetheless endorsed an antiquated version of First 
Amendment protections for public employees.97 
The right to a jury trial in a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation suit is 
particularly important to the protection of public employees because of the 
fact-intensive nature of analyzing whether the employee spoke as a citi-
zen.98 Jurors, who are representatives of the community, are better suited 
than a single judge, who may impose his or her own understanding of work 
duties, to decide whether the plaintiff spoke as a citizen or as a public em-
ployee.99 Furthermore, empirical data suggests that juries typically rely on 
                                                                                                                           
Amendment); supra note 18–19 and accompanying text (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pro-
vides for the right to a jury trial). In Mayhew, the Sixth circuit held that the inquiry into the pro-
tected status of speech is a question of law. Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464. Therefore, the question of 
whether an employee’s speech is protected is reserved for the court and excluded from the jury, 
which allows it to be decided on summary judgment. See supra, note 28 and accompanying text 
(explaining that questions of law are reserved for the court); supra note 31 and accompanying text 
(explaining questions of law are properly decided on summary judgment). In contrast, if it the 
Sixth Circuit had held the question was a mixed question of law and fact, whether the employee’s 
speech was protected would be resolved by juries who are intended to find facts. See supra note 
29 and accompanying text (explaining juries typically resolve questions of law and fact). 
 97 See Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (restricting public employees’ speech by holding Lane did 
not transform the inquiry into the protected status of public employees’ speech into question of 
mixed law and fact). By making it more difficult for a public employee to have their case heard by 
a jury, the predominately conservative Sixth Circuit was promoting an old notion: a State may 
condition public employment on a basis that encroaches on the employee’s interest in exercising 
their constitutionally protected free speech. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983) (lim-
iting government restriction of public employees’ speech). 
 98 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424 (stating that inquiry into whether individual spoke as citizen 
or as public employee is “practical one”); Washington Gas-Light Co. v. Lansden, 172 U.S. 534, 
547 (1899) (stating that an analysis on whether employee spoke within his or her scope of em-
ployment may present genuine issue of fact for jury); Sarah F. Suma, Note, Uncertainty and Loss 
in the Free Speech Rights of Public Employees Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 83 CHI. KENT L. REV. 
369, 379 (2008) (noting that courts cannot rely on job descriptions to determine whether speech 
was part of one’s work duties). 
 99 See Suma, supra note 98, at 379–85 (describing how courts have defined job duty). Some 
courts construe work duties very broadly so that an employee will almost always speak pursuant 
to his work duties. See, e.g., Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 492 F.3d 1192, 
1198–99, 1203–05 (10th Cir. 2007) (interpreting work duty broadly); Piggee v. Carl Sanburg 
Coll., 464 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006) (interpreting employment duties broadly). Other courts 
have interpreted employment duties very narrowly so that speech is more likely to fall outside of 
one’s work. See, e.g., Charles v. Grief, 522 F.3d 508, 516 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that the plaintiff 
spoke as private citizen); cf. Jackson v. Jimino, 506 F. Supp. 2d 105, 110 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating 
that it is not clear whether the plaintiff spoke pursuant to his work duties); Kodrea v. City of Ko-
komo, 458 F. Supp. 2d 857, 868 (S.D. Ind. 2006) (denying defendants’ summary judgment motion 
because it was unclear whether plaintiff spoke as citizen or as public employee); Elizabeth M. 
Ellis, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Left to Decide “Your Conscience or Your Job,” 41 
IND. L. REV. 187, 196–207 (2008) (supporting a narrow interpretation of work duty). Therefore, 
the question should instead be resolved by the jury. See R.R. Co. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 
663–64 (1873) (declaring “twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one 
man,” and can therefore draw better inferences from facts than a judge); Julia Reytblat, Is Origi-
nality in Copyright Law a “Question of Law” or a “Question of Fact?”: The Fact Solution, 17 
102 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:E. Supp. 
reasonable strategies to evaluate conflicting evidence and produce defensi-
ble verdicts in cases closely resembling §1983 suits.100 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mayhew is a blow to employees’ rights 
and is especially forceful because it heavily influences the eventual resolu-
tion of the debate.101 All historically liberal Circuits Courts of Appeals have 
persistently taken the employee-friendly position by letting the jury deter-
mine the status of speech as a mixed question of law and fact.102 Historical-
ly conservative Circuit Courts, however, remain split, with some holding 
the inquiry remains a question of law and others holding it has transformed 
into a mixed question of law and fact.103 This pattern renders the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Mayhew especially relevant to determining where the ma-
jority lies on the issue because it will likely be determined by the more flex-
                                                                                                                           
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 181, 207–09 (1999) (arguing that juries represent standards of com-
munity and are therefore better equipped to find fact). 
 100 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519–51, 549–50 (1991) (finding jurors interpret evidence in a 
cognitively sound manner). Specifically, juries are well equipped to handle tort-like cases. See 
City of Monterey, 526 U.S. at 709 (finding § 1983 suits are similar to tort suits because plaintiffs 
allege damage from constitutional violation); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jessica M. Salerno, Em-
pirical Analysis of Juries in Tort Cases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 
414–436, 421 (2013) (finding research provides little support for widely held view that jurors are 
indiscriminately pro-plaintiff); Pennington & Hastie, supra, at 549–50 (1991) (finding jurors in-
terpret evidence in cognitively sound manner). Ultimately, jurors are neither incompetent, nor 
biased, and therefore are well suited for deciding whether speech fell within the scope of an em-
ployee’s ordinary job duties. See generally Pennington & Hastie, supra (studying narrative struc-
tures created by mock jurors). 
 101 Fox v. Traverse City Area Pub. Sch. Bd. Of Educ., 605 F.3d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 2010) (cit-
ing the circuit split). The sides of this circuit split over whether the inquiry into the status of an 
employee’s speech is one of law remain level with the D.C., Fifth, Eleventh and Tenth Circuits 
holding the issue is a question of law, while the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits con-
cluding the issue presents a mixed question of law and fact. Id. 
 102 See id. (citing circuit split and listing the positions of the Federal Courts of Appeal); Circuit 
Court Map, PRATT SCH. INFO., http:////visualfa.org/circuit-court-map/ [https:////perma.cc/NB2W-
2TX2] (providing an analysis of the political ideologies of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals). 
The political ideology of the Circuit Courts has been measured by the number of conservative and 
liberal decisions they have made between 1943 and 2010, as well as how the Supreme Court ruled 
when hearing cases that passed through each circuit. Circuit Court Map, supra. The Eighth and 
Ninth Circuits, which have been characterized as historically liberal, both found the inquiry into 
the protected status of an employee’s speech to be a mixed question of law and fact. Fox, 605 F.3d 
at 350 (citing circuit split); Circuit Court Map, supra. 
 103 Fox, 605 F.3d at 350 (citing the circuit split and listing the positions of the Federal Courts 
of Appeal). The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, which have been characterized as historically 
conservative, found the inquiry into the protected status of an employee’s speech to be purely 
legal. Id. (citing the circuit split); see Circuit Court Map, supra note 102 (providing analysis of the 
political ideologies of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals). Conversely, the Third and Seventh 
Circuit, which have also been characterized as historically conservative, found the inquiry to be a 
question of mixed law and fact. See Circuit Court Map, supra note 102 The differing holdings 
among the Federal Circuits suggest that liberal courts may remain united in protection of employ-
ees’ rights, while conservative courts’ opinions may be more malleable. Id. 
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ible conservative courts.104 Unfortunately for employees within its jurisdic-
tion, it seems that Lane will not be the case to shift the Sixth Circuit’s cur-
rent position that the question is one of fact.105 
CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 1968, a long line of cases has established the First 
Amendment right of public employees to speak as citizens on matters of 
public concern without the fear of retaliation. Historically liberal courts 
have all taken the employee-friendly position that the inquiry into the pro-
tected status of employees’ speech has transformed into a mixed question of 
law and fact. Conversely, historically conservative courts remain divided on 
whether the inquiry remains a question of law. In Mayhew v. Town of Smyr-
na, the historically conservative U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
had the rare opportunity to protect the voices of public employees by en-
larging their First Amendment protections. By holding that the protected 
status of speech remains a question of law for the court to decide, the Sixth 
Circuit instead frustrated public employees’ right to a jury trial that typically 
accompanies § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claims. The public sector 
could go unchecked as public employees become hesitant to report miscon-
duct at their jobs. 
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 104 See Circuit Court Map, supra note 102. 
 105 See Lane, 134 S. Ct. at 2369 (holding that public employees’ speech ordinarily within the 
scope of their job duties is unprotected by the First Amendment); Mayhew, 856 F.3d at 464 (hold-
ing the inquiry into the protected status of public employees’ speech is a question of law). Despite 
several public employees’ attempts to argue for the contrary, it seems Lane will not disrupt other 
Circuit Courts’ holdings either. See Anderson, 845 F.3d at 596 (ruling that Lane’s addition of 
“ordinarily” did not clearly change the formulation used in Garcetti); Flora, 776 F.3d at 179 n.11 
(refraining from deciding whether Lane changed or clarified Garcetti). 
